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ARGUMENT
A.  Setting aside default and denial of motion for default judgment.
Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation dba St. Mark’s Hospital (“St. 
Mark’s”) was served in May 2007 with a Notice of Intention to Commence 
an Action by Roth. [R336]  St. Mark’s through its attorneys stipulated that a 
proceeding before the Department of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing (“DOPL”) would serve no purpose [R68] which provided for a 
certificate of compliance to be issued by DOPL so that Roth could file his 
lawsuit. [R336]   On March 31, 2008 St. Mark’s attorneys received the 
Summons and Complaint dated January 17, 2008. [R68] (Emphasis 
added)  The Summons on its face stated that an answer was due within 30 
days of service. [R28].    The only reason given for the failure to file an 
answer to the Summons and Complaint was a non-attorney in the attorneys 
office incorrectly calendared the due date at 45 days. [R68 and 76-77]. 
There is no dispute that St. Mark’s did not file a timely answer.  [See page 6 
of St. Mark’s Brief acknowledging the due date to answer as April 24, 2008 
and they did not file until May 9, 2008].
St. Mark’s opens its Argument at page 19 of its Appellee Brief 
arguing that a trial court is endowed considerable discretion in granting 
or denying motions to set aside a default.  Roth agrees.  St. Mark’s cites 
some cases, mainly federal cases that make relief from a default easier to 
obtain than relief from a default judgment and argues that it would be an 
abuse of the court in not granting relief in a case like the one before this 
Court based upon this less stringent requirement for granting relief.
However, this is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court decision cited in 
Roth’s Brief at pg 22, concluding that Rule 60(b) criteria are applicable to 
demonstrate “good cause” under Rule 55(c), See Gold Standard, Inc. v. 
American Barrick Resources Corp., 805 P.2d 164, 168 (Utah 1990) and does 
not square with a recent decision of this Court.  In Davis v. Goldsworthy, 
184 P.3d 626 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) in a case involving a default, like St. 
Mark’s claim in this case, Goldsworthy’s theory was essentially one of 
excusable neglect.  This Court in Davis v. Goldsworthy, at 630 id. “To 
demonstrate that the default was due to excusable neglect, ‘[t]he movant 
must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.’”  Citing Black’s 
Title, Inc., 1999 UT App. 330, ¶10, 991 P.2d 607 (quoting Airkem 
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973).  “Absent such a 
showing, [a defaulting party[‘s assertion does not demonstrate his neglect 
was excusable.” Id.  
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All that the Trial Court had to go on was that the answer was not filed 
by the deadline and that the only excuse was that a non-attorney staff 
member for HPS calendared the response date at 45 instead of the required 
30 days.  There was absolutely no requisite showing of due diligence after 
the attorneys received the summons and complaint and no showing or even 
suggestion of any kind that HPS was prevented from appearing by 
circumstances over which they had no control.
 This Court should follow its own precedence as it declared under 
similar circumstances in Davis v. Goldsworthy, at 630, id.  “reverse and 
remand to the trial court for the detailed findings required by Utah case law 
and for such orders as may then be appropriate.” 
B. Discovery of legal injury through due diligence.
Dr. Joseph appears to argue that the burden is on Roth to overcome 
the trial court’s determination that he discovered his legal injury on October 
13, 2004 or at least by January 5, 2005.   However, this burden is and has 
been Dr. Joseph’s to establish. See C  onder v. Hunt  , 2000 UT App 105, ¶ 14, 
1 P.3d 558, cert. denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000). ¶ 14 "As with any 
affirmative defense, defendants have the burden of proving every element 
necessary to establish that the statute of limitations bars [plaintiff's] claim." 
Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996). See Stewart v. K & S 
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Co., 591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979); Slayden v. Sixta, 250 Kan. 23, 825 
P.2d 119, 122 (1992) (stating "the burden of pleading and proving" statute of 
limitation's applicability "rests on the defendant").
Dr. Joseph argues that since Roth obtained his medical records on 
January 5, 2005 the statute of limitations was triggered by at least this date if 
not the earlier date of October 13, 2004 when Roth admittedly learned of his 
physical injury.   It appears from Dr. Joseph’s argument that he is claiming 
that Roth learned of his legal injury on October 13, 2004 when he dis-
covered that the polypectomy site was not removed during surgery. 
However, all this establishes is that Roth learned of his physical injury, but 
in no way equates to his discovery of his legal injury. The statute of limita-
tions that Dr. Joseph is seeking to invoke is U.C.A. §78B-3-404(1).  It 
provides “…malpractice action… shall be commenced within two years 
after…patient discovers,…the injury…”  “Injury” (legal injury) is defined as 
discovery of injury and the negligence that caused the injury.  Foil v. 
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148-9 (Utah 1979).  As for obtaining medical re-
cords on January 5, 2005, it is an incredulous claim that this established the 
day Roth knew of his legal injury.  This would be like handing someone 
who does not know Arabic the Quran written in Arabic and then claiming 
that as of that date they were aware of the teachings of Muhammad.
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The law in Utah is clear that in order to invoke the statute of limita-
tions in this case, short of Dr. Joseph delineating some definitive event or 
date that clearly demonstrates Roth learned of his legal injury, it is for the 
jury to conclude when this occurred or should have occurred through due di-
ligence.   The Utah Supreme Court in a recent case, Daniels v. Gamma West 
Brachytherapy, 2009 UT 66, ¶31, 221 P.3d 256 (2009) declared,
Tying the statute of limitations’ trigger to the discovery 
 of the cause-in-fact of a patient’s injury does not leave 
health care professionals endlessly susceptible to revived 
claims. Instead, the discovery rule is tempered by a 
requirement that a patient act with reasonable diligence in 
investigating a suspected injury. Thus, the statute of 
limitations begins when exercising such diligence a patient 
should have discovered his injury and its possible negligent 
cause. Whether and when a patient should have discovered 
an injury and its cause is a fact intensive question that 
requires a jury to determine, given the information available, 
whether the actions taken in response to an injury and the 
efforts extended to discover its cause were adequate.  
The one record in these voluminous medical records that Dr. Joseph is 
“hanging his hat on” is an obscure office note of Dr. Voorhees in June 2004. 
By itself it does not really shed light on any determination that a negligent 
act occurred.  At best it may lead one to further inquiry as to its meaning. 
That is exactly what Roth proceeded to do.  He made inquiry through the 
depositions of Dr. Joseph and Dr. Voorhees in January 2007 as to the 
meaning of problems involving the tattoo ink.  
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In this case it is for the jury to determine when Roth through due dili-
gence should have discovered his legal injury.  As we learned from the 
Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, case at ¶31, in order for the jury to 
make this determination they also need to know “….which event it is evalu-
ating for whether the plaintiff was aware or should have been aware of what 
was the negligent cause of his injury.”   Roth on October 13, 2004 was led 
by Dr. Joseph to believe that the surgeon was responsible [R236 ¶19] caus-
ing Roth to concentrate on this causal event, the May 24, 2004 surgery, and 
not look at Dr. Joseph’s April 28, 2004 treatment.   
C.  Discovery of Legal injury – Issue Preclusion
Dr. Joseph argues issue preclusion based upon Judge Lindberg’s 
ruling in the Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App. 313 (unpublished) (attached 
hereto in the Appendix).  The trial court dismissed this case based upon its 
determination that Roth discovered his legal injury on October 13, 2004 and 
therefore his filing his statutory notice to commence an action and suit in 
2008 was more than two years from this date and therefore the statute of 
limitations had run.  This Court affirmed the dismissal; however, upon 
different grounds than applied by the Trial Court.  This Court rejected the 
determination that Roth discovered his legal injury on October 13, 2004 and 
instead determined that by at least the time he initiated a malpractice action 
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against the surgeon he had discovered his legal injury, some nineteen 
months later.  See Roth v. Pedersen, pg 3 of this Court’s unpublished 
Memorandum Decision (Appendix).  In order to use issue preclusion to 
establish that Roth discovered his legal injury on October 13, 2004, such 
prior position must have been successful, and in the prior case it was not. 
See 3D Constr. & Dev., L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 
307, ¶11, 117 P.3d 1082, 1085-86 "Under judicial estoppel, 'a person may 
not, to the prejudice of another person, deny any position taken in a prior 
judicial proceeding between the same persons or their privies involving the 
same subject matter, if such prior position was successfully maintained.' " 
Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74,¶ 26, 34 P.3d 180 (quoting 
Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388, 
390 (1942)).
Furthermore, Dr. Joseph in his Brief at page 28 sets forth the criteria 
that must be met before issue preclusion is applied, citing Oman v. Davis 
School District, 2008 UT 70, ¶29, 194 P.3d 956.  
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been 
a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in 
the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits.  
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Roth is the party in both suits for which Dr. Joseph seeks issue 
preclusion, so element (i) is met and the memorandum decision in the prior 
appeal "resulted in a final judgment on the merits."  See State v. Baker, 176 
P.3d 493, 496 (Utah App. 2008); thus, element (ii) is met.  The litigation 
however, was never completely and fully litigated in that there was no 
hearings conducted, there was no evidence provided to the Court, and in this 
jury case no jury was impaneled.  Thus element (iii) was not met and as for 
element (ii) the issue decided is not identical to the issue in the matter at 
hand.  Dr. Pedersen was sued for alleged malpractice that occurred in a 
surgical procedure on May 24, 2004; whereas, Dr. Joseph is being sued for 
medical malpractice related to his treatment in a separate causal event in 
April 2004.
Not withstanding the foregoing argument, the final decision on the 
merits in Roth v. Pedersen, pg. 3, id., concluded that Roth discovered his 
legal injury by May 2006 and as such the statute of limitations in this case 
would have similarly run in May 2008, some four months after Roth filed 
suit against Dr. Joseph and St. Mark’s.   
D. Concealment
Where the June 8, 2004 letter from Dr. Voorhees to Dr. Joseph plays a 
significant role in this case is that it represents information that Dr. Joseph 
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had a duty to disclose to Roth after receipt of the letter from Dr. Voorhees. 
Dr. Joseph was absolutely required to inform Roth that he was experiencing 
problems with the SPOT ink used to tattoo Roth’s polypectomy site and that 
it was likely Dr. Voorhees failed to remove this cancerous site in the May 
24, 2004 surgery, which information was critical for Roth in determining 
how to proceed in protecting his body.  A doctor does have a common law 
fiduciary duty “to disclose to his patient any material information 
concerning the patient’s physical condition.” Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 
348, 354 (Utah 1980). See Daniels, 2009 UT 66, ¶51. The question of what 
is “material information” is for the jury.   Nixdorf v. Hicken at 354, id.
Roth testified in his affidavit herein, that the first he became aware of 
the June 8, 2004 letter from Dr. Voorhees to Dr. Joseph was during the 
deposition of Dr. Joseph in 2007. The fact this letter was not in Dr. Joseph’s 
medical records certainly raises a question for the jury as to why Dr. Joseph 
concealed this letter from Roth.  This certainly raises a material issue of fact.
Dr. Joseph argues that Roth’s argument of fraudulent concealment is 
baseless and Roth was required to prove that Dr. Joseph affirmatively acted 
to conceal.  The law is clear in Utah that a doctor has a duty to disclose to 
his patient material medical information.  Nixdorf v. Hicken, at 354 id.
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The Court in Charlesworth v. Reyns, 113 P.3d 1031, 1037 (UT App. 2005) 
stated, “A fiduciary's breach of the 'duty to speak the truth' is sufficient to 
establish fraudulent concealment. Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 78 
P.3d 616, aff'd as to result, 108 P.3d 741, 752 (quoting Chapman v. Primary 
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989)).   
Dr. Joseph states that where fraudulent concealment is alleged the 
circumstances forming the basis of the allegation must be stated with 
particularity.   Roth has stated acts of fraudulent concealment with 
particularity.   Roth pointed to Dr. Joseph’s knowledge of the problems the 
surgeon experienced in the botched surgery, that it related to his failure to 
properly tattoo the polypectomy site, his failure to disclose his 
miscommunication to the surgeon as to the location of the polypectomy site 
and his failure to disclose to Roth that the surgeon asked Dr. Joseph to 
promptly perform a colonoscopy in order to determine if the polypectomy 
site had been removed as he was concerned that it might not have been. 
[R1-8].  Dr. Joseph much like the defendant Dr. Veasy in Chapman v. 
Primary Children’s Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989), misdirected Roth 
away from looking at him for malpractice [R236 ¶19]  and although aware 
of critical medical information that he was required and had a duty to 
disclose to Roth, he remained silent (concealment).   “In this case, however, 
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the Chapmans' complaint, though drafted in an admittedly ‘scattershot’ 
fashion, contains the averments that defendants withheld information 
regarding the cause of Jennifer's injuries and ‘misinformed [the Chapmans] 
by, among other things, advising them that the brain damage sustained by 
Jennifer Chapman was an unavoidable event which was not caused by any 
misconduct on the part of any of the defendants.’  This is a sufficiently clear 
and specific description of the facts underlying the Chapmans' claim of 
fraudulent concealment to support our conclusion that the requirement of 
rule 9(b) has been met. See Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 553, 17 P.2d 
244, 250 (1932).”   Roth respectfully submits that he has as well made 
sufficiently clear and specific description of the facts underlying his claim of 
fraudulent concealment to support a conclusion that the requirement of Rule 
9(b) has been met.
         CONCLUSION
The Trial Court did not make the requisite findings to support St. 
Mark’s request for relief for excusable neglect, specifically no findings were 
made and interestingly nothing was provided by St. Mark’s showing due 
diligence and that it was prevented from appearing by circumstances over 
which it had no control.  This Court should reverse the Trial Court’s setting 
11
aside the Default Certificate and remand for the detailed findings required by 
Utah case law and for such orders as may then be appropriate.
The Order granting Summary Judgment must be reversed as genuine 
issues of material fact exist as to when Roth discovered or through due 
diligence should have discovered his legal injury.  Specifically there is 
actually no date provided in the Record that establishes Roth’s discovery of 
both the causal event and the negligence which caused his physical injury. 
As to when he should have through due diligence discovered the causal 
event and the negligence is a fact intensive matter for the jury to determine. 
The Order granting Summary Judgment must be reversed as a genuine issue 
of material fact exists as to whether Roth was prevented from discovering 
his legal injury because of the alleged fraudulent concealment of Dr. Joseph. 
Issue preclusion is inapplicable in this case and does not support the 
summary judgment entered herein.
For these reasons, this Court should reverse and remand on the 
granting of Rule 60(b) relief to St. Mark’s and allow the Trial Court to make 
such findings under Utah law as to whether or not St. Mark’s can 
demonstrate that their failure to timely file an answer to the Complaint was 
due to excusable neglect.  This Court should reverse the Summary Judgment 
entered in favor of the defendants and allow a jury to decide when Roth 
discovered the causal event and negligence that caused his injury and/or 
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determine whether there was fraudulent concealment in order for the Trial 
Court to then be able to determine whether the statute of limitations ran or 
had not run in this case.
DATED this 24th day of March 2010.
_____________________________
David E. Ross II
Attorney for Appellant 
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APPENDIX
Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App. 313.
Entered October 29, 2009, as an unpublished Memorandum Decision
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